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CAN OBSERVERS PREDICT TRUSTWORTHINESS?
Michèle Belot, V. Bhaskar, and Jeroen van de Ven∗
Abstract—We investigate whether experimental subjects can predict behav-
ior in a prisoner’s dilemma played on a TV show. Subjects report prob-
abilistic beliefs that a player cooperates, before and after the players
communicate. Subjects correctly predict that women and players who make
a voluntary promise are more likely to cooperate. They are able to distin-
guish truth from lies when a player is asked about her intentions by the
host. Subjects are to some extent able to predict behavior; their beliefs are
7 percentage points higher for cooperators than for defectors. We also study
their Bayesian updating. Beliefs do not satisfy the martingale property and
display mean reversion.
He that has eyes to see and ears to hear may convince him-
self that no mortal can keep a secret. If his lips are silent, he
chatters with his fingertips; betrayal oozes out of him at every
pore.
—Sigmund Freud (1905)
I. Introduction
ECONOMIC and social relationships cannot be governedentirely by formal contracts, leaving scope for oppor-
tunistic behavior. This highlights the importance of trust and
trustworthiness in sustaining efficient economic transactions.
Using cross-country data, Knack and Keefer (1997) find that
trust raises economic growth, while La Porta et al. (1997)
find that it is associated with lower corruption and judicial
efficiency.
As important as the average level of trustworthiness or
trust is the extent to which an individual can judge how trust-
worthy his partner in a transaction is. Numerous experiments
show that individuals are heterogeneous in their willingness
to cooperate (Blanco, Englemann, & Normann, 2006). This
raises the question, Can one trust a particular individual?
If “betrayal oozes out of every pore,” then many profitable
transactions can be undertaken, even if the overall level of
trustworthiness is not very high? Trustworthy agents will
also have an advantage in economic and social transactions.
Conversely, if the overall level of trustworthiness is low and
individuals find it hard to distinguish agents with different
propensities, then one-shot transactions can often be inef-
ficient and one must rely on either repeated interaction or
contractual mechanisms to deter opportunism. This suggests
another reason that trust is high between individuals who are
socially close (see Glaeser et al., 2000), since they may be
able to “read” one another.
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This question is also related to a strand of evolution-
ary game theory that argues that if propensities are even
partially observable, then nonmaximizing behavior, such
as being trustworthy, may be evolutionarily stable (Frank,
1988; Guth & Yaari, 1992; Dekel, Ely, & Yilnakaya, 2007).
The involuntary truth-telling hypothesis (Frank, 1988; Ock-
enfels & Selten, 2000) asserts that types are observable:
opportunists inadvertently look and behave differently from
trustworthy people, despite their attempts at deception.
The practical importance of detecting opportunism is
quantifiable in sectors of the economy that are particularly
susceptible to fraud, such as insurance, the tax and benefit
system, and the criminal justice system. These sectors spend
large sums of money in training individuals so that they can
distinguish fraudulent claims from genuine ones. Anderson
(1999) estimates that fraudulent transfers amount to $550 bil-
lion annually in the United States. Laband and Sophocleus
(1992) report that investments in white-collar crime preven-
tion cost $216 million in the United States in 1985. However,
the scope of our inquiry is wider than fraud. In many business
relationships, opportunism is not illegal, and the consequent
moral or social sanctions are weaker.
Despite the economic importance of the question of
whether trustworthiness is distinguishable from opportun-
ism, there is little prior work on the subject. The closest is
work by psychologists on whether experimental subjects can
distinguish true statements from false ones, and we discuss
this work. One practical problem is that opportunism and
deception are by their intrinsic nature hard to observe: suc-
cessful deception often goes unnoticed, and honesty is rarely
completely verifiable in the field. We overcome this problem
by using DVDs of a game show, where two players play a
prisoner’s dilemma game. Our experimental subjects watch
the show and are asked to predict behavior. This has two
advantages. First, players on the game show freely choose
their decisions, so that they incur any psychological or moral
costs associated with opportunism. Second, their decisions
are not anonymous but publicly observable. We observe per-
fectly whether a player is opportunistic or trustworthy, further
enhancing the psychological and moral costs of opportunism.
Compared to a fully experimental design, using the game
show has the further advantage that the stakes for the players
are high, giving real incentives to appear trustworthy.
Prior to playing the prisoner’s dilemma, the two play-
ers communicate verbally and face-to-face, allowing them
to convey the honesty and sincerity of their intentions. Our
experimental subjects are shown the game show players until
the crucial decision and asked to report their beliefs—the
probability that a player shares. Subjects make predictions
regarding any player twice. A subject’s interim belief is
her prediction made before she observes the communication
stage. Her final belief is her prediction after communication.
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This allows us to see how subjects update their belief and
allows us to study (Bayesian) updating in the context of a
natural and complex problem. In addition, we also elicit each
subject’s prior belief or her base rate—her prediction of the
average rate of cooperation across all episodes of the game
show.
Our empirical methodology is based on the random assign-
ment of episodes to groups of subjects. Each subject makes
predictions for several players, with differing characteristics
and behavior. We use the within-subject variation in predic-
tions to identify how subjects update their beliefs in response
to perceived signals. More specifically, we regress subject
beliefs on player characteristics and behavior and compare
the estimated coefficients with the analysis of the game show
data, which shows how these same variables affect shar-
ing behavior. Behavior on the game show is analyzed in a
companion paper (Belot, Bhaskar, & van de Ven, 2010).
Our main findings are as follows. Subjects appear to use the
right cues in forming beliefs. For instance, they rightly believe
that a woman is more likely to share than a man, although
they underestimate the magnitude of the difference. Sub-
jects also ignore characteristics such as age or attractiveness
that our analysis shows to be irrelevant. Our most interesting
findings relate to how subjects update after observing com-
munication by the players. The game show data reveal that a
player’s explicit promise to share is associated with a signif-
icantly higher probability of sharing by the player when this
promise is made voluntarily, that is, at the player’s own ini-
tiative. The experimental subjects correctly revise their final
beliefs upward on observing a voluntary promise, although
they underestimate the size of this effect. Thus, talk is not
cheap when voluntarily undertaken and is correctly perceived
as such by our observers. Some of the players who make a vol-
untary promise are in fact lying, and we find that our subjects
are unable to distinguish truth from lies. Thus, the involuntary
truth-telling hypothesis is not valid for voluntary promises.
Our second set of findings relates to the response made
by a player when he or she is asked explicitly and unexpect-
edly about his or her intentions by the presenter of the show.
Such a player invariably replies that he or she will share.
These elicited promises are not associated with any greater
propensity to share in our data. However, we find evidence
of the “Columbo effect”: our subjects are able to read these
responses and distinguish truth from lies.1 In comparison
to situations where players do not make any promise, sub-
jects revise their final beliefs upward in response to elicited
promises that in fact turn out to be true, but not in the case
of elicited promises that turn out to be false. Thus, the invol-
untary truth-telling hypothesis seems to be valid for elicited
promises.
By using these signals of cooperation, our subjects can
to some extent distinguish cooperators from defectors. The
1 Named after the TV detective Columbo who finishes interviewing sus-
pects and then invariably surprises them with “one last question.” We are
grateful to Steve Nickell for this analogy.
average player who shares induces subject beliefs that are
7 percentage points higher than the average player who
grabs.2 This estimate is significant in view of the fact that
our subjects are untrained and exposed to the players for
only a short time and since predictions by nonprofessional
subjects have historically generally been only barely better
than chance.
Our final set of findings relates to Bayesian updating, since
we are able to study how subjects update in a complex and
natural setting, where they are exposed to a range of differ-
ent signals. We present and test a simple Bayesian model
and find that our basic results are robust to allowing for non-
linear effects that arise in a Bayesian setting. However, we
also find significant violations of Bayesian rationality. Most
significant, we reject the martingale property of beliefs that
the prior should equal the average posterior. Instead, we have
mean reversion in beliefs: subjects with a low prior tend to
have a higher posterior, while those with a high prior have a
lower posterior.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
discusses the related literature. Section III presents the data
and experimental setup. In section IV, we present results on
how subjects perceive player characteristics and communi-
cation. Section V presents the theory and evidence regarding
Bayesian updating. Section VI analyzes how subject charac-
teristics affect their beliefs and discusses the determinants of
how accurate subjects are, and section VII concludes.
II. Related Literature
Economists have recently become interested in deception.
Gneezy (2005) studies the factors that make a person more
likely to deceive. Wang, Spezio, and Camerer (2006) study
pupil movements to see whether deceivers send involuntary
signals. The flip side of this question, whether deception is
detectable, has been the preserve mainly of psychologists. In
the typical psychology experiment, an actor is instructed to
lie or to tell the truth, and an observer assigns a truth value
to the actor’s statement.3 Ekman and Friesen (1974) showed
nurses a movie that could be pleasant or nasty; in either case,
the nurse was instructed to tell an interviewer that the movie
was pleasant. These interviews were videotaped and shown
to observers. Observers are given little or no information on
how the statements have been selected, so they may have little
basis for forming a prior regarding the underlying probability
of lying. Observers are generally not paid for accurate pre-
dictions, and the subjects telling lies are usually not paid for
successful deception, although the nurses were told that this
was important for their career.4
The general finding is that observers are not able to detect
lies. Their success rate in classifying statements is usually
2 This estimate is based on a regression of subject predictions on an
indicator for the sharing decision, with subject fixed effects and random
effects.
3 Ekman (1985) and DePaulo and Friedman (1998) provide good surveys.
4 Exceptions are Frank and Ekman (1997) and Kraut and Poe (1980), who
gave a bonus to participants who were judged to be honest.
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not significantly higher than 50% (chance). DePaulo, Stone,
and Lassiter (1985, p. 327) conclude that “deception accu-
racy usually exceeds chance, although rarely by an impressive
margin.” For instance, the widely cited study by Ekman and
O’Sullivan (1991) reports an accuracy of 3 percentage points
above chance. Estimates range from about 42% accuracy to
68% accuracy, but only a small minority of about 10% of the
studies find an accuracy of at least 10 percentage points above
chance (Vrij, 2008). In his review of the literature since 1980,
Vrij (2008) finds an average accuracy of around 54% among
nonprofessionals. However, people with training, such as fed-
eral officers and secret service agents, manage to do better
(Ekman, O’Sullivan, & Frank, 1999).
Since the deceivers in these experiments have been
instructed to lie, this may reduce guilt and make detection
harder. This problem is avoided by Mann, Vrij, and Bull
(2002), who show police officers videotapes of statements by
actual criminal suspects. Here again, the officers were pro-
vided no information on how these statements were selected,
giving little basis for forming a prior regarding the underlying
rate of lying. It is therefore hard to tell whether optimistic pre-
dictions are due to an optimistic prior or to the interpretation
of signals.
On predicting trustworthiness, previous work includes
Dawes, McTavish, and Shaklee (1977), Frank, Gilovich, and
Regan (1993), and Brosig (2002), who let subjects commu-
nicate before playing a prisoner’s dilemma game and asked
them to predict the decision of their opponents. Their focus
is on the overall accuracy of predictions rather than the cues
used and perceived by subjects. They argue that subjects
are able to predict their opponent’s play with an accuracy
rate above chance. Dawes et al. (1977) report an accuracy
of 3 percentage points above chance in their experiment 1
and an accuracy below chance in experiment 2. Frank et al.
(1993) find an accuracy of 11 percentage points above chance
and Brosig (2002) 8 percentage points above chance. How-
ever, their attribution of what constitutes chance when the
true cooperation rate differs from 50% is questionable. If
the cooperation rate differs from 0.5, subjects could outper-
form this chance measure by simply predicting cooperation
or defecting every time. Using this benchmark of chance,
the observers in these studies do not do better than chance.5
Ockenfels and Selten (2000) conduct a bargaining exper-
iment where subjects are randomly assigned high or low
bargaining costs, and this is private information. They find
that observers are able to guess the true costs of the bargain-
ers 55% of the time. However, they argue that this success
can be explained by objective features, such as the length of
5 In existing studies (Frank et al. 1993; Brosig, 2002), chance is defined
as γ = pq + (1 − p)(1 − q), where p is the reported fraction of cooperators
and q is the actual cooperation rate. If, for instance, q > 0.5, then subjects
can achieve a success rate of q by always predicting cooperation, and this
outperforms γ, since then q > (1 − q); hence, q(1 − p) > (1 − q)(1 − p)
and thus q > γ. Intuitively, if the actual probability is above one-half,
then without any further information, the best prediction is cooperation,
and mixing between predicting cooperation and defection yields a lower
accuracy.
Figure 1.—Monetary Payoffs
the bargaining negotiations, rather than the ability to detect
involuntary signals.
Our setup has several methodological advantages over
existing studies. The main methodological differences are
as follows:
1. Players on the game show freely choose their deci-
sions, so that they incur any psychological or moral
costs associated with opportunism.
2. We observe perfectly whether a player is opportunis-
tic or trustworthy. Compared to a fully experimental
design, using the game show has the advantage that the
stakes for the players are high, giving real incentives to
appear trustworthy.
3. We ask subjects to report probabilistic beliefs rather
than a binary variable and provide incentives such that
reporting true beliefs is optimal. This enables us to mea-
sure more precisely which cues subjects use to predict
sharing and how accurate their predictions are.
4. Each subject sees a random sample of episodes. We
do not select for a certain proportion of cooperators
(or truth tellers). Subjects could therefore have a prior
based on how likely it is that players share in such a
large stakes environment on TV.
5. Each subject makes predictions for a sample of play-
ers. This allows us to identify how subjects vary their
beliefs depending on player characteristics, by using
the within-subject variation in predictions. For the com-
munication stage, we can go further by using only the
change in predictions made by the subject for the same
player, before and after communication.
6. We have a large number of predictions: over 3,000.
III. Background and Description of the Data
A. The Game Show
We showed our subjects edited episodes of a TV game
show, focusing on the final stage of this game where two
players play a prisoner’s dilemma game.6 Each player must
choose whether to share (S) or to grab (G) a sum of money X.
The monetary payoffs to the row player as a function of his
own action and his opponent’s action are depicted in figure 1.
6 The show was broadcast in the Netherlands as Deelt ie ’t of deelt ie
’t niet, which translates as Does S(he) Share or Not? For a more detailed
description of the game show, see Belot, Bhaskar, and van de Ven (2009,
2010).
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Table 1.—Individual Characteristics of Players
Lead Player Chosen Player
Number of observations 69 69
Mean age 33.9 32.1
Share women 22% 52%
Table 2.—Distribution of Outcomes and Stakes
Outcome Frequency Median Stake (€)
Percentage sharing 43% 1,683
Both share (S,S) 19 3,090
One shares (G,S) 48 1,533
Both grab (G,G) 33 1,850
That is, if both players share, each gets X2 , if only one
player shares, his opponent gets the entire amount, and if
both players choose to grab, both get 0. The median value of
X is 1,683 euros, so that the stakes are substantial. Tables 1
and 2 present summary statistics of the player characteristics
and outcomes of the game. We distinguish between lead and
chosen players. Prior to the final stage, players earn their score
by answering quiz questions. The lead player is the player
with the highest score, and that player selects the chosen
player from the other remaining players to enter the final
stage. A third of players are female, and the mean age is 33
years. Women tend to answer fewer quiz questions and are
for that reason less likely to end up as lead player. Players
share 43% of the time, and their decisions are uncorrelated,
so that in 19% of the episodes, both players share.
B. Experimental Setup
We ran seventeen sessions, five of them in Utrecht in May
2006, with 89 subjects, and twelve in Amsterdam in May
2007, with 80 subjects. The subjects were mainly social sci-
ence students, with one session using support and support
staff from the university of Utrecht. The 69 episodes were ran-
domly assigned to sessions, the typical subject seeing either
four episodes (Utrecht) or six episodes (Amsterdam).
The game show lasts 25 minutes, consisting of several
rounds of quiz questions and the sequential elimination of
players until only two of the original five remain. Most of
the show may not be relevant for predicting the decisions
made by the final two players. For this reason, and to econ-
omize on time, we showed our subjects shortened episodes.
In the 2006 sessions, subjects saw two entire episodes (last-
ing around 25 minutes each) and two shortened episodes (6
minutes each). The shortened versions did not include the
rounds with the quiz questions, but include the stage where
the players introduce themselves and the stage where one of
the three remaining players is to be eliminated. An analysis
of the data confirmed that watching the entire game show did
not make a difference to the subjects’ predictions.7 Therefore,
7 For interested readers, this analysis is available on request from the
authors.
Figure 2.—Time Line for Game Show
in the 2007 sessions, we showed the subjects four shortened
episodes and two slightly longer (medium) episodes, which
also included the last round of quiz questions.
The show was paused several times, at which points we
asked subjects to make predictions (see figure 2). The first
time was just before the selection decision is made, where
we asked subjects to predict which player would be cho-
sen for the final.8 They were asked to assign a probability
of each of the two players shares, at two points: before
the players made speeches to each other and after.9 Sub-
ject choices were restricted to a discrete grid, with step size
0.1: {0, .1, . . . , .9, 1}. They were paid according to a qua-
dratic scoring rule and were told that they should report their
beliefs truthfully in order to maximize expected earnings.
The experiment lasted about 90 minutes, and subjects earned
approximately 18 euros, including 4 euros for participation.10
Subjects were not given any feedback on the actual deci-
sions that the players made so as to prevent learning. We are
also confident that the subjects are unlikely to have seen the
episodes they were asked to make predictions about.11
At the end of the session, we ascertained personal details
of the subjects and asked them to estimate the average coop-
eration rate over all the 69 episodes of the show. They were
paid 1 euro if their prediction lay within 5 percentage points
of the true value. Answers and earnings were private and not
divulged to other subjects. We also asked the subjects to play
the prisoner’s dilemma game of the game show. In Utrecht,
this play was hypothetical: we asked the subject what he or
she would do as a player on the game show. In Amsterdam,
8 These selection predictions are used for another project (see Belot et al.,
2009), and we do not discuss them further here.
9 In the Utrecht sessions, the show was paused only twice: right before the
selection decision and after the communication. Because the opponent of
the lead player was still unknown to the subjects at the selection decision,
we asked them to predict the sharing probability of the lead player against
each of the two possible opponents. To some extent, this is akin to the strat-
egy method. Brandts and Charness (2009) review the literature comparing
decisions with and without strategy method and report that most studies
find that the strategy method does not lead to different behavior than the
more standard direct-response method does. Comparing the Utrecht and
Amsterdam sessions, we find no difference in the average prediction rate;
it is equal to 50% in both locations.
10 The nonstudent session was run mainly with support staff. To provide
incentives to them, we offered them a lunch for participation, and out of
the fourteen we randomly chose two subjects who earned around 40 euros,
depending on their choices. We found no differences in their predictions as
compared to the student groups.
11 There was a five-year lag between the experiment and the game show.
The show was not very popular (it was broadcast in the afternoon and lasted
only one season). We also asked subjects if they had seen the show. Very
few subjects said yes, and these could not remember any specific show or
contestants.
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Table 3.—Sharing Probabilities: Summary Statistics
Sharing Probability Mean SD
Actual game show data (N = 138) .43 .50
Prior (N = 169) .43 .21
All predictions before communication (N = 1, 672) .52 .26
All predictions after communication (N = 1, 672) .52 .29
each subject was asked to make a choice (share or grab).
Two subjects were selected randomly afterward, and their
choices were implemented, with a total stake of 200 euros.12
We asked the Amsterdam subjects if they would like to donate
part of their earnings to a charity, Warchild.13 The Amster-
dam subjects also did a short test of cognitive ability, taken
from Frederick (2005). We conducted a small experiment to
infer their risk preference, by letting subjects choose between
a fixed amount (2 euros) and a series of lotteries with vary-
ing stakes. The complete instructions we provided are in the
appendix.
IV. Perceived Cooperative Traits
Players on the game show share 43% of the time. This is
exactly what the subjects expect on average when asked to
report the average sharing probability across all 69 episodes
(see table 3). However, their average prediction is 9 percent-
age points higher, at 52%. This suggests that a typical subject
judges the median player that she sees to be above the median
in terms of trustworthiness. That is, on seeing any specific
individual, a subject is more likely to trust this individual
than when asked the question in abstract, perhaps because
of the positive image the players give of themselves. Possi-
bly this effect is even larger for players on the show, as they
experience the presentation firsthand.14
As we will see, the content of communication is strongly
predictive of predictions but consistent with Bayesian updat-
ing; the average prediction is the same before and after
communication, so that on average, subjects do not revise
their estimates in a systemically biased way. However, we find
strong violations of Bayesian updating if we compare predic-
tions before and after communication for different levels of
the predictions (see section V).
12 Cooperation rates were higher in the Amsterdam sample (59% against
45% in Utrecht). We cannot tell whether this was due to different incentives
or because they were matched with a player on the show (in Utrecht) or
with another participant of the experiment (in Amsterdam).
13 Warchild raises funds to help children who are victims of war across
the world and is among the best-known charities in the Netherlands. The
subjects could donate 0%, 5%, 10%, or 20% of their earnings.
14 We explored this exposure effect by comparing predictions of subjects
who saw short or long versions of episodes but found no difference. We also
note that different elicitation methods were used for the overall prior and
predictions: quadratic scoring rule for reported beliefs and a fixed amount
if within 5 percentage points of the correct answer for the prior. While we
cannot exclude the possibility that this can account for the difference, this
seems unlikely because the scoring rule gives minimal distortions in our
setup (see also note 20).
Table 4.—Actual Cues and Perceived Cues
Dependent Variable: Actual Realizations Beliefs
Sharing Decision (1) (2)
Female .19 (.09)∗∗ .08 (.03)∗∗∗
Age .00 (.01) .00 (.001)
Contribution −.72 (.31)∗∗ −.04 (.05)
Prize (×1,000 euros) .03 (.01)∗∗ .01 (.003)∗∗∗
Attractiveness −.03 (.07) −.02 (.02)
Number of observations 138 1,672
R2 .23
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ** and *** correspond to 5% and 1% significance levels,
respectively. Column 1: bivariate probit estimates, marginal effects. Column 2: OLS estimates, with standard
errors clustered by player.
A. Cooperative Cues
We now investigate how subjects form their beliefs and
how they update their prior in response to information. Our
empirical strategy is based on the random assignment of
episodes to groups of subjects and on the panel aspect of
the data. Subjects were asked to report predictions for sev-
eral players with different characteristics. We can therefore
identify how subjects update their beliefs in response to this
information using the within-subject variation. This may be
compared with the analysis of how actual behavior varies
with characteristics, conducted in Belot et al., 2009).
We model the prediction of subject i regarding player j as
pij = αi + β′Xj + δj + εij, (1)
where pij is the prediction of subject i regarding player j,15 αi
is a subject fixed effect, Xj is a vector of observable character-
istics of player j, and the error term includes a player-specific
component (δj) and an idiosyncratic i.i.d. component (εij).
β can be interpreted as the average update in response to a
signal X.
Column 1 in table 4 reports the results from the analysis
based on the data from the game show (see Belot et al., 2009).
The reported coefficients are the marginal effects of the pro-
bit estimates. Women are almost 20 percentage points more
likely to share than men,16 and those who contribute relatively
little to the final prize money are more likely to share. A larger
stake slightly increases sharing, while age and attractiveness
have statistically insignificant effects. Column 2 shows how
these characteristics determine the predictions that the sub-
jects reported. We find that subjects pick up some of the
relevant cooperative signals but tend to underestimate the
magnitude of the effects. They correctly believe that women
are more cooperative and also expect a positive relationship
between the size of the stakes and cooperativeness. On the
other hand, they do not perceive a correlation with the relative
15 This is the final prediction after communication. This makes it easier
to compare the results with those from our analysis on the decisions in the
game show (since the decisions are taken after communication). The results
are similar if we use predictions made before communication
16 Such gender effects are not new. See Belot et al. (2009) for a discussion
how they relate to the existing literature.
CAN OBSERVERS PREDICT TRUSTWORTHINESS? 251
Table 5.—Communication and Sharing: Summary Statistics
Contents Communication % Players in Category Fraction Sharing
All .43 (.50)
No promise (N = 74) 54 .28 (.45)
Promise (N = 64) 46
Of which:
Voluntary (N = 19) 70 .73 (.45)
Elicited (N = 45) 30 .26 (.45)
Elicited promises are promises in response to question by the presenter. Standard deviations are in
parentheses.
contribution to the prize, although there is a strong relation-
ship in the actual data. Finally, they correctly do not associate
age or attractiveness with cooperativeness.
B. Communication
We now turn to the perception of promises and lies. Before
the players make their final decision in the last round, they
have the opportunity to make a brief speech. This speech
is “cheap talk” in the sense that any statements made are
not binding and do not affect monetary payoffs. It has been
established that communication is very effective in foster-
ing cooperation (Sally, 1995). In particular, promises are
informative about intended behavior, because subjects are
reluctant to lie (Gneezy, 2005).
In an analysis of the decisions of players, Belot et al. (2010)
find that promises are very informative about the behavior of
players. However, not all promises are alike in this respect.
Voluntary promises, those that are at the player’s initiative,
are highly correlated with sharing behavior. In some cases, the
presenter explicitly asks a player if he or she intends to share.
Subjects invariably respond affirmatively to this question
(with one exception), and we label these elicited promises.
Elicited promises are uncorrelated with actual sharing deci-
sions. Table 5 provides descriptive statistics on promises, and
the percentage of players who share by types of promises.
Forty-six percent of the players make an explicit promise
to share, specifically stating “I will share” or “I promise to
share.” Those who do not make an explicit promise usually
talk about what they intend to do with the money, try to con-
vince the other player to share, or say in general terms that
“sharing is good.” Out of all promises, about 30% are elicited
promises. The most striking fact is that those who make a vol-
untary promise are almost 50 percentage points more likely
to share than those who do not.
Do the predictions by subjects reflect the above findings?
Table 6 reports summary statistics on predictions. Individual
predictions are reported for both before and after communi-
cation by type of message and decision of players. From this,
we see that mean beliefs are somewhat higher after voluntary
promises than after no promises or elicited promises, but the
difference is small. Interestingly, beliefs are similar before
and after communication when players make no promise
or a voluntary promise. This is very different after elicited
promises. In that case, we see that the predicted probabil-
ity of sharing increases by 10 percentage points after a true
elicited promise, while it decreases by 4 percentage points
for players who make false elicited promises.
Table 6 also shows the accuracy level of predictions before
and after communication, where accuracy is measured as p if
a player shares and 1−p if a player grabs. By this simple mea-
sure, the accuracy rate is higher for true promises than false
promises, and the effect is biggest for voluntary promises.
To summarize this, we find that beliefs are more optimistic
after voluntary promises, and the accuracy is highest after
voluntary true promises. By contrast, comparing before and
after communication, accuracy of predictions increases most
after elicited promises, suggesting that subjects can identify
liars better in this case. This is possibly a consequence of the
Columbo effect; if subjects are surprised by the question of
the presenter, they may find it harder to disguise lies.
Since we ask subjects to report predictions for the same
players before and after the communication stage (denoted
pbeforeij and p
after
ij , respectively), we can identify precisely the
effect of communication on predictions. We estimate the
following equation:
pafterij − pbeforeij = β0 + β1promisej + εij, (2)
where β0 and β1 are constants, promisej is a dummy indicating
whether the player made an explicit promise, and εij is an
i.i.d. random disturbance term. We consider different types
of promises; and distinguish between truthful promise and
lies.
First, we find that subjects do see that promises are cor-
related with cooperative behavior, and are to some extent
capable of identifying liars. Table 7 reports the results of
a regression, where the dependent variable is the change in
beliefs of the subjects, as a function of the content of commu-
nication by the player. The first column shows that subjects
increase their beliefs when a player makes a promise, but
the effect is significant only for voluntary promises. This
suggests that subjects understand that lying after making a
voluntary promise is psychologically more costly than after
an elicited promise. Possibly subjects anticipate stronger feel-
ings of guilt in this case (as, for instance, in Charness &
Dufwenberg, 2006), but in any case, this is evidence against
a pure cost-of-lying per se story that does not differentiate
types of lies. The effect is relatively small, though: predictions
increase by about 5 percentage points for voluntary promises
in comparison to the average increase of 50 percentage points
in the game show data. So, overall, subjects fail to capture
the magnitude of the effect of voluntary promises.
Since some players who make a promise choose to grab,
column 2 investigates whether subjects are able to identify
liars. Subjects are not able to distinguish truth from lies when
they see a voluntary promise but are able to do this very well
when the promise has been elicited. There could be several
reasons for this. Those who initiate a promise may be better
liars or lies prompted by a surprise question may be harder
to disguise. In any case, subjects become substantially more
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Table 6.—Predictions by Subjects: Summary Statistics
Prior (N = 169); Belief: .43 (.21)
Before Communication After Communication
Average Rate of Average Rate of
Individual Predictions Belief Accuracy Belief Accuracy
All predictions (N = 1, 672) .52 (.29) 52 .52 (.30) 52
No promise—shares (N = 268) .53 (.25) 53 .51 (.31) 51
No promise—grabs (N = 642) .52 (.26) 48 .50 (.29) 50
Voluntary promise—true (N = 367) .56 (.25) 56 .56 (.30) 56
Voluntary promise—-false (N = 247) .55 (.26) 45 .53 (.29) 47
Elicited promise—true (N = 35) .43 (.28) 43 .53 (.31) 53
Elicited promise—false (N = 113) .56 (.25) 44 .52 (.28) 48
Belief is prediction of sharing. Prior is average reported belief over all episodes. Standard deviation in parentheses. Accuracy is measured as p(1 − p) if a player shares (or grabs)
Table 7.—Communication and Beliefs
Difference in Sharing Predictions
before and after Communication
Dependent Variable: (1) (2)
Voluntary promise .05 (.01)∗∗∗ .04 (.02)∗∗
Elicited promise .02 (.02) .13 (.05)∗∗∗
Voluntary promise and lying .03 (.02)
Elicited promise and lying −.15 (.05)∗∗
Constant −.03 (.01)∗∗∗ −.03 (.01)∗∗∗
R2 .008 .014
Number of observations 1,672 1,672
OLS estimates. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ correspond to 5% and 1%
significance levels, respectively.
optimistic regarding players from whom a promise has been
elicited and who will indeed cooperate.
These results are related to those of Charness and Dufwen-
berg (2006, 2010) who conduct experiments on a trust
game where subjects can create and send open format mes-
sages, finding that personalized promises are effective while
impersonal promises are not.
Since communication is sequential, there might be dif-
ferences in how subjects update their beliefs depending on
whether the player is first or second to speak. In the actual
data, we found no correlation between the player’s speech
and the behavior of the opponent. For example, the second
player’s speech or behavior does not depend on whether the
first player makes a promise. We find no systematic differ-
ences in the predictions made for players 1 and 2; these results
are not reported for the sake of brevity. However, we do find
a significant correlation (.25) in predictions made for both
players, so that subjects believe that the players’ decisions
are correlated.
C. Overall Quality of Predictions
We now consider how well subjects predict the sharing
decision. Overall, they correctly predict an average coopera-
tion rate of 43%. However, it can well be that subjects have
learned what the average cooperation rate is but still find it
very difficult to predict behavior for any specific individual.
Because they tend to underestimate the importance of several
cues, the accuracy of predicting a specific player’s behavior
is lower than what is possible. To examine how well subjects
predict, we regress final beliefs on the sharing decision while
including subject fixed effects and player random effects, in
the form of the following equation:
pij = α + δi + βsharej + εij,
where α is a constant, δi is a subject-specific fixed effect, and
εij = ηj + ξij (that is, we cluster standard errors at the player
level). Because subjects make multiple predictions, we can
filter out the subject’s prior beliefs and directly estimate how
beliefs differ for players who end up sharing in comparison
to players who end up grabbing. The null hypothesis cor-
responding to random reports (chance) is β = 0. Thus, β̂
provides a direct measure of accuracy. Our estimated value
for β is .07, and this is significant at the 1% level. Thus, if
a player shares, this is associated with a 7 percentage point
increase in subject beliefs.
Our subjects are untrained and exposed only briefly to the
players. In addition, there may be some measurement error if
some subjects do not truthfully report beliefs. To the extent
that some subjects report random beliefs instead of truthful
beliefs, this will bias the results toward chance levels. These
factors suggest that our estimate is a lower bound on what
subjects can achieve.
Because our context differs from existing studies in impor-
tant respects, it is not straightforward to compare findings to
the existing literature. As pointed out before, previous studies
rely on binary reports. Subjects will report different beliefs
only if, on observing a certain cue, their posterior crosses the
threshold level of reporting 0 versus reporting 1. With these
coarser data, valuable information needed to identify the cues
that subjects use is lost, which will limit the preciseness of
accuracy measurements. If we coarsen our belief variable by
classifying a belief greater than 0.5 as 1, and that less than
0.5 as 0, the accuracy level of our subjects is 0.52, no differ-
ent from chance by any reckoning of chance. This suggests
that previous studies may have underestimated the ability of
subjects to predict behavior by using coarse predictions.17
17 On the other hand, we argued in section II that some studies (Frank et
al., 1993, and Brosig, 2002) overestimated the ability of subjects by using a
wrong benchmark of what constitutes chance. On balance, these concerns
point to the importance of a suitable methodology.
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V. Bayesian Updating
We now consider how updating by our subjects corre-
sponds to a standard Bayesian model. First, we investigate
the possible nonlinear effects that arise in Bayesian updating.
Second, we test the martingale property of beliefs.
A. Nonlinear Updating
Let us consider a player who will make a decision ω ∈
{G, S}. G corresponds to grab, and S corresponds to share.
The observer, or subject i, reports the probability that ω = S.
This is based on observing signals emanating from the player.
We model the subject as a Bayesian who makes his prediction
based on his prior and on the signals that he observes. Let
us suppose that the decision maker forms a subjective prior
belief μi about the probability that a player will share. For
the purposes of this section, we will use the term prior to
include either the subject’s interim belief or her estimate of
the average sharing probability across all episodes (what is
termed the prior in the rest of the paper). The posterior would
then correspond to the final belief or the interim belief or final
belief, respectively.
Suppose now that the subject observes a signal, σ, which
takes values in a finite set. Let qi(s|ω) denote the probability
assigned by the subject to the signal taking value s given that
the state equals ω. The decision maker’s posterior belief that
ω = S is given by πi(s):
πi(s) = μii(s)
μii(s) + (1 − μi) , (3)
where i(s) = qi(s|S)/qi(s|G) is the subjective likelihood
ratio for signal s. This is a nonlinear function of the prior and
the likelihood ratio. However, algebraic manipulation of this
expression yields the following linear specification,
ln
πi(s)
1 − πi(s) = ln
μi
1 − μi + ln li(s).
In other words, if we transform variables so that the depen-
dent variable is constructed from posterior and prior beliefs
using the above formula, this should be a linear function
of indicator variables corresponding to the various signal
realizations.
Consider first the case where the prior is the subject’s
reported average sharing rate across all episodes. In this case,
the dependent variable can be constructed from the poste-
rior (the reported interim or final belief), and we can control
for the prior by including subject fixed effects in the regres-
sion. Of course, this assumes that different individuals have
the same subjective likelihood ratio when evaluating signals.
Second, one may wish to study how subjects update from
interim to final beliefs for any given player. In this case,
our dependent variable is constructed as ln πi(s)1−πi(s) − ln
μi
1−μi .
In either case, the specification is now linear as a function
Table 8.—Actual and Perceived Cues (Log-Likelihood Ratios)
Dependent Variable:
Sharing Decision Actual Realizations Final Beliefs
Female .78 (.25)∗∗∗ .62 (.17)∗∗∗
Age > 32 .14 (.12) .14 (.17)
30% ≤ Contribution ≤ 70% −1.17 (.66)∗ −.02 (.22)
Contribution > 70% −.92 (3.05) −.08 (.27)
Score < median score −.09 (3.61) −.35 (.17)∗
Attractiveness > 4 −.18 (.26) −.13 (.19)
Voluntary promise (cross-section) 2.12 (.33)∗∗∗ .21 (.17)
Voluntary promise .36(.10)∗∗∗
(final versus interim beliefs)
Number of observations 138 1,672 1,672
Column 1: Log ratios derived from probit estimates and standard errors computed with delta method.
Column 2: OLS estimates with subject fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses; * and *** denote
10% and 1% significance levels respectively. Standard errors are clustered by show contestant in column.
Voluntary promise: cross-section based on comparison players who make or do not make promise; final
versus interim beliefs based on subjects reporting player specific beliefs before and after communication.
of signal realizations. We therefore estimate the following
model:
ln
pij
1 − pij = αi + β
′Xj + δj + εij.
For the characteristics (k) that are binary dummy variables
(such as gender, promises), the estimated coefficient β̂k equals
ln (pij |Xkj=1)1−(pij |Xkj=1) − ln
(pij |Xkj=0)
1−(pij |Xkj=0) (that is, to the log-likelihood
ratio). We can calculate the corresponding value in the actual
data,
ln
(̂pij|Xkj = 1)
1 − (̂pij|Xkj = 1) − ln
(̂pij|Xkj = 0)
1 − (̂pij|Xkj = 0) ,
where p̂ij is the predicted value of p̂ij conditional on Xk and
on the average values of all other characteristics included in
the vector X. To ease the exposition, we report results using
dummy variables for all player characteristics. Table 8 shows
the results. For the game show data, we can estimate the coef-
ficient on promises by comparing sharing behavior between
subjects who do and do not make a promise (cross-section),
and for beliefs by subjects, we can either estimate the coeffi-
cient based on predictions reported after communication only
(cross-section) or by comparing final versus interim beliefs
reported by the same subject and for the same player.
The results confirm what we have found with the lin-
ear specification. Overall, subjects do perceive the correct
signals but underestimate their magnitude. However, the gen-
der coefficient we estimate from subjects’ beliefs (0.62) is
not significantly different from the gender coefficient esti-
mated from the players’ actual decisions (0.78). Therefore,
the update of beliefs in response to gender is consistent with
Bayesian updating.
A second implication of Bayesian updating from equation
(3) is that for given subjective likelihood ratios, the extent
of updating is a nonlinear function of the prior, and the sub-
ject updates more for nonextremal priors and less for extreme
priors. However, we might also expect that this relationship
is overturned if more extreme priors are also correlated with
more extreme likelihood ratios. That is, a subject who is cau-
tious may simultaneously be more likely to have prior beliefs
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Table 9.—Actual Cues and Perceived Cues Depending on the Prior
Dependent Variable: Actual Realizations Beliefs
Sharing Decision (1) (2)
Female .19 (.09)∗∗ .066 (.027)∗∗
Female and low prior .062 (.034)∗
Female and high prior .023 (.063)
Age .00 (.01) .001 (.002)
Age and low prior −.001 (.002)
Age and high prior −.001 (.004)
Contribution −.72 (.31)∗∗ −.045 (.055)
Contribution and low prior −.017 (.072)
Contribution and high prior .097 (.129)
Prize (×1,000 euros) .03 (.01)∗∗ .009 (.004)
Prize and low prior −.005 (.007)
Prize and high prior .008 (.008)
Attractiveness −.03 (.07) −.012 (.020)
Attractiveness and low prior −.027 (.028)
Attractiveness and high prior .007 (.053)
Number of observations 138 1,664
R2 .24
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** correspond to 10% and 5%, significance levels
respectively. Standard errors are clustered by player in column 2.
that are closer to 0.5 and also have likelihood ratios that are
close to 1.
To investigate more closely this nonlinearity, we differen-
tiate three ranges of priors ([0,0.2], [0.3,0.7], and [0.8,1]),
where the prior is the subject’s estimate of the probability of
sharing across all 138 players on the game show. We now esti-
mate a linear specification, while allowing the coefficient on
characteristics to vary depending on the prior. These results
are reported in table 9. We find little support for nonlinear
updating. For most variables, we cannot reject that the coef-
ficients are identical across priors, and for gender, we find that
those with a low prior update their beliefs significantly more
than those with priors in the medium range. This suggests
that those with more extreme priors also have more extreme
likelihood ratios. Similar results are obtained when we con-
sider the difference between final and interim beliefs. There
is no evidence that the magnitude of updating is greater for
interim beliefs that are intermediate rather than extreme.18
B. Testing the Martingale Property of Beliefs
Under Bayesian updating, beliefs satisfy the martingale
property: the prior must equal the weighted average of
posteriors and can be written as
μi =
∑
s
Pr(s)πi(s), (4)
where Pr(s) is the subjective probability that signal s will be
observed:
Pr(s) = μiqi(s|S) + (1 − μi)qi(s|G).
That is, for any prior of any subject, the prior equals the
expected value of the posteriors. The empirical implication
18 For reasons of space we do not report econometric results on this, but
this may be verified by inspecting figure 4.
Figure 3.—Prior and Subject Mean Prediction
is that the average of realized posteriors should equal the
prior.
Figure 3 plots the actual subject’s mean of predicted final
beliefs against the subject’s estimate of the average probabil-
ity of sharing across all 138 players on the game show, that
is, her prior. At low values of the prior, the mean posterior
is higher than the prior, but at high values, the mean poste-
rior is lower than the prior.19 In other words, we have mean
reversion in beliefs and a violation of the martingale property.
The hypothesis of equality of priors and average posteriors
can also be tested by comparing interim beliefs (predictions
before communication) and final beliefs (after communi-
cation). Since the equality in equation (4) holds for each
subject, we can aggregate across subjects. We therefore test
this hypothesis for each value of interim beliefs, pooling
across subjects. Figure 4 shows the mean change in predic-
tions corresponding to each possible value of interim beliefs
and as a function of the type of communication. The pat-
tern is striking: changes are far from being 0 on average at
almost any value of interim belief. For low interim beliefs,
the average change is positive, while for high interim beliefs,
it is negative. That is, final beliefs are systematically higher
than interim beliefs when interim beliefs are low and sys-
tematically lower when the interim belief is high.20 It is also
noteworthy that subjects with extreme interim beliefs are
changing their final beliefs quite dramatically, while Bayesian
updating implies that they should change their beliefs very
little in response to signals. Nevertheless, our results regard-
ing the voluntary and elicited promises hold even when
19 A t-test shows that the posterior is systematically higher than the prior
for values of the prior values below .6 and is systematically lower than the
prior for values of the prior above .6. Averaged across all priors, the mean
final belief is greater than the mean prior.
20 A t-test rejects the null hypothesis of the equality of the prior to the aver-
age of the posteriors for each value of interim beliefs (at the 5% significance
level).
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Figure 4.—Prior and Mean Change Predictions
conditioning on the level of interim beliefs. The changes in
updates are larger when subjects see a promise.21
The model that best describes our subjects’ behavior seems
to be one where each subject reports her belief with error.
Suppose that the prediction pik by subject i in instance k is
given by
pik = pˆik + εik , (5)
where pˆik is the “true” belief, from a unimodal distribution
centered close to 0.5, and εik is an i.i.d. error term. The sub-
ject’s report equals pik as long as it lies in the unit interval, and
0 or 1 otherwise. This model can generate the mean reversion
in beliefs that we observe, as well as the fact that subjects
change their beliefs substantially even when their reported
priors are extremal. One interpretation is that subjects find it
difficult and costly to uncover their true beliefs, which gives
rise to this error. The fact that they are given new information
and an opportunity to think again (say, after communica-
tion) gives rise to a degree of independence in the error term
across predictions. This model can potentially explain both
of our findings. Updating is not systematically of smaller
magnitude for extremal reported priors, since these extremal
priors are likely to have a larger error term. Mean reversion
in beliefs also follows straightforwardly from this model. We
leave further exploration of this model for future work.
Our findings relate to an extensive literature on Bayesian
updating by experimental subjects. The literature documents
several biases (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Grether, 1980;
Gilovich, Griffin, & Kahneman, 2002; Charness & Levin,
2005), overconfidence in the precision of own estimates
(Lichtenstein, Fischloff, & Phillips, 1980; Biais et al., 2005),
21 Note that we chose to pay subjects for all predictions rather than choos-
ing one at random. The advantage of paying for all predictions is that
distortions due to probability weighting are minimized (see Offerman et al.,
2009). Moreover, the existing experimental evidence does not find support
for hedging behavior (Blanco et al., 2008).
and overreaction to recent news (DeBondt & Thaler, 1990;
Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Individuals are often found to
underweight new information relative to the prior; however,
other individuals exhibit the opposite bias and overweight
new information or show no sizable bias (El-Gamal &
Grether, 1995; Camerer, 1987).
In relation to this literature, our findings are, to our
knowledge, somewhat novel, since we reject the martingale
property of beliefs, with agents tending to move away sys-
tematically from extreme prior beliefs.22 It is possible that we
uncover this since we study updating by experimental sub-
jects in the context of a natural and complex problem, rather
than urn-ball experiments, which also tend to have a limited
range of prior beliefs. A Bayesian subject needs to think about
all possible signals and her posterior in each of these events.
Her prior is a weighted average of these posteriors. It is clear
that our subjects do not behave in this way. It is also striking
that many subjects have extreme priors such as 0 or 1, which
would seem quite irrational, especially in view of their sub-
sequent posteriors. We have suggested that a model of errors
in reported beliefs can best describe subject behavior.
VI. Subject Characteristics
We now turn to the relation between subject characteristics
and their beliefs. A first question is, What kinds of subjects
think that players are trustworthy? A second question is, Do
subjects who are better at predicting differ in a systematic
way from others?
We first study the determinants of the level of beliefs. Our
data are eminently suited to study this question since we have
a random assignment of players to subjects and multiple pre-
dictions on each player, allowing us to exploit the variation
in predictions regarding the same player across subjects. Our
second source of information is a subject’s predicted average
cooperation rate, or prior. Recall that subjects were asked
to report the average rate of sharing over all 69 episodes
of the show and were rewarded with one extra euro if their
prediction was within 5 percentage points of the true value.
The prior and the subject mean prediction are correlated,
with a correlation coefficient of 0.38 that is significant at the
1% level. We show the results in table 10. Columns 1 and
2 are based on the whole sample, and columns 3 and 4 are
based on the Amsterdam sample only. We find that the best
predictor of a subject’s beliefs is his or her own decision
in the prisoner’s dilemma game. An individual who shares is
more likely to believe that the game show players will share.23
That is, subjects who are more cooperative also believe that
others are more cooperative; this is consistent with findings
in Glaeser et al. (2000) using survey data.
22 The martingale property of market expectations has been extensively
tested in the context of financial markets; however, this may hold even if
individual level beliefs do not satisfy the martingale property.
23 If we do not control for the decisions to share or to donate to the charity,
we find a larger, positive gender effect (which is significant in the regression
based on the same sample as column 1). However, the gender effect is not
as good a predictor as the decision to share in the PD game.
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Table 10.—Subject Characteristics—Prior and Actual Predictions
All Samples Amsterdam Sample
Beliefs Prior Beliefs Prior
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Female .023 (.024) .008 (.036) −.013 (.047) .002 (.063)
Age .000 (.002) .00004 (.00001)∗∗ .000 (.006) .004 (.009)
Number of siblings .010 (.011) .001 (.016) .005 (.020) −.008 (.026)
Psychology student −.029 (.033) −.020 (.050) −.044 (.040) .051 (.074)
Other studies −.002 (.024) .035 (.037) −.004 (.040) .075 (.054)
Employed .044 (.054) .102 (.066)
Shares in PD game .050 (.023)∗∗ .114 (.034)∗∗∗ .063 (.039) .065 (.053)
IQ test score −.002 (.010) −.025 (.013)∗
Charity donation .147 (.410) .485 (.550)
Number of subjects 168 168 80 80
R3 .19 .13 .26 .21
OLS estimates; beliefs are individual predictions; prior is the estimated average reported for all players in the game show. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote 10%, 5%, and 1%
significance levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered by show contestant in columns 1 and 3.
A priori there are different explanations for this positive
correlation. First, theories of inequity aversion predict that
people are more likely to cooperate if they believe that the
opponent is likely to cooperate as well (see, for instance,
Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Charness
& Rabin, 2002). Second, people may project their prefer-
ences onto others, thinking that the average person behaves
like them (see Messé & Sivacek, 1979). This false consensus
effect is possibly a result of rationalizing behavior stemming
from cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957) if subjects can
make themselves feel better by believing that others would
behave similarly.24
The second question is, Who are the subjects who are better
at predicting behavior? Since a subject’s earnings is a measure
of the quality of her prediction, we estimate the following
equation:
Eij = δj + β′Xi + αi + εij,
where δj is a player fixed effect and αi is a subject random
specific effect.
Table 11 reports the results. We find some evidence that
women are better at predicting than men are. Women are also
substantially more cooperative in our sample (82% against
46% in the Amsterdam sample, 60% against 23% in the
Utrecht sample), so these results suggest that women are
also somewhat better at identifying cooperators.25 Next, eco-
nomics and psychology students perform slightly worse on
average than the others, and we find some correlation between
risk aversion and quality of predictions. We find no correla-
tion, however, between the actual cooperative behavior and
the quality of predictions. Those who choose “share” in the
prisoner’s dilemma game do not perform better than those
who choose “grab.” Thus, besides the correlation between
24 Subjects report their beliefs before they know that they will play the pris-
oner’s dilemma game, so that their beliefs cannot adjust to actual behavior.
Nevertheless, it is possible that generic defectors have more pessimistic
beliefs than cooperators due to cognitive dissonance.
25 In some other experiments, women are also more cooperative, although
the evidence is mixed (see Eckel & Grossman, 1999).
Table 11.—Determinants of the Quality of Predictions
Earnings per Prediction (OLS Estimates)
All Samples Amsterdam Sample
Dependent Variable (1) (2)
Female .028 (.033) .082 (.044)∗
Age −.005 (.003) −.001 (.006)
Number of siblings .019 (.014) .039 (.020)∗∗
Economics student
Psychology student .024 (.036) .027 (.048)
Other type of studies .039 (.033) .115 (.044)∗∗
Employed .129 (.057)∗∗
Shares in PD game .002 (.030) .009 (.039)
Prior −.040 (.075) .032 (.117)
IQ test score .011 (.010)
Charity donation −.405 (.411)
Number of safe choices .025 (.014)∗
Impatient −.006 (.044)
Player fixed effects Yes Yes
Number of observations 3,680 1,896
Number of subjects 168 79
R3 .14 .20
OLS estimates including player fixed effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. * and **
correspond to 10% and 5% significance levels, respectively, and are clustered at the subject level.
gender and earnings, we find very little evidence that coop-
erators are better at identifying other cooperators. Finally,
we find no evidence of a correlation between IQ or time
preferences and earnings.
VII. Conclusion
We examine the ability of subjects to predict the behavior
of the players of a prisoner’s dilemma game. Our key finding
is that trustworthiness does appear to be somewhat pre-
dictable. Most important, subjects revise their beliefs upward
in response to a promise that is volunteered by a player but
not in response to a promise that arises due to an explicit
question. This suggests that our subjects understand that lies
that are volunteered are psychologically more costly. Subjects
are also able to distinguish truth from lies when a promise
is made in response to an explicit question by the presenter,
in line with the involuntary truth-telling hypothesis. Over-
all, our untrained subjects assign a 7 percentage point higher
CAN OBSERVERS PREDICT TRUSTWORTHINESS? 257
probability of cooperation to cooperators as compared to
defectors, suggesting that opportunism is indeed to a cer-
tain extent detectable even by naive subjects. There may be
several reasons that subjects underestimate the magnitude
of several signals. One possibility is that subjects are only
briefly exposed to the players on the show, and not all facial
and nonfacial expressions are visible to the audience. This
makes it harder to observe certain types of signals, such as
those related to lying. In addition, subjects are relatively unfa-
miliar with the environment. How the accuracy of subjects
varies with these and other factors is left for future research.
By eliciting subject beliefs at two different stages on the
show, we are also able to study the updating process. We find
mean reversion of extreme beliefs, in a way that is inconsis-
tent with the martingale property of beliefs. Thus our paper is
a contribution to the literature on Bayesian and non-Bayesian
updating in the context of a natural and complex problem.
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APPENDIX
Instructions
In the Utrecht sessions, subjects watched the show up to the point where
the lead player chooses the other finalist (see figure 2). They then predict
the selection decision and also predict the sharing decision for every player.
Since the opponent of the lead player was still unknown to the subjects,
we asked them to predict the sharing probability of the lead player against
each of the two possible opponents. They then watch the show up to the
point where the two finalists had to make their decision to share or grab,
and make predictions again.
In the Amsterdam treatment, we asked subjects only to predict which of
the two contestants would be selected to play the final round. Sharing deci-
sion predictions was not asked for at this point, but only after the selection
decision was made. They watch the show up to the communication stage
and make predictions again.
These were the basic instructions (translated from Dutch):
Welcome! The experiment lasts for about 90 minutes and consists of
several parts. During the experiment, you earn points that are worth
money. The exact amount you earn depends on your score and can
go up to about 20 euros. None of the other players will know what
you earn, and all your answers will be treated confidentially.
How you earn money. During the first part of the experiment, you
will see fragments of a television game show. You will be asked to pre-
dict choices of contestants. The more accurate your predictions are,
the higher your score and the more money you earn. Only your own
choices determine your score and not the choices of other participants.
The TV show. The game show starts with five candidates. Each
round, the candidates have to answer trivia questions. Their score
depends on the number of questions answered correctly. At the end
of the round, one player is eliminated by the highest-scoring player.
After three rounds, there are three candidates left. At that point, the
highest-scoring player can decide who to take with him or her into
the final. The candidate who chooses is guaranteed to go to the final.
In the final, the scores of both candidates are added. This is the
amount of money they will be playing for. Both players simulta-
neously decide whether to share or shaft. There are three possible
situations:
1. They both share. In this case, they both get half of the amount
of money.
2. One candidate shares and the other does not share. In this
case, the one who does not share gets the whole amount. The
candidate who shares gets nothing.
3. They both do not share. In this case, nobody wins any money.
Before making their decision, they have the opportunity to
communicate.
[An example was included.]
Instructions. You will see six shortened episodes. In two episodes
you’ll see one round of trivia questions; in the other four, we skip
all trivia rounds. We start by showing the beginning where the three
relevant candidates introduce themselves.
The show is paused at the moment three candidates are left, and
the candidate with the highest score decides whom to select to play
the final with. At that point, we will ask you to predict the following:
Which candidate will be selected to be taken into the final?
After you made your predictions, we show you the rest of the
episode and pause again when the candidates show their intentions
to the viewers at home (their choice is hidden for you) and when the
finalists make their definite choices. At that point, we ask you again
to make a prediction: Will a candidate share or not? [In Amsterdam
we randomized between predicting sharing and predicting grabbing.]
We ask you to indicate probabilities. For instance, we ask you what
you think is the probability that Jennifer will share if she ends up in
the final. Imagine you think that Jennifer shares with a probability
of 20% (probability 0.2) and hence grabs with 80% probability. You
indicate this as follows:
After filling in your answer sheet, we ask you to put it in the
envelope on your table. After you do this, you are not permitted to
take it out the envelope. Hence, you cannot go back to an earlier
question.
Your earnings. At the end of the experiment, we compare your
predictions to the actual outcomes. You score is higher if your pre-
dictions are better. The most you can earn per prediction is 2 points
and the minimum is 0 points. Every point is worth 0.35 euros. The
amount you earn is calculated by the formula below. This formula
is chosen in such a way that it is in your interest to report your true
beliefs. By reporting any other number than what you truly believe,
your expected earnings are decreased. Proof of this can be requested
at the end of the experiment.
Your score depends partly on your choices in other parts of the
experiment. Instructions for other parts follow later. Your score in
this part does not affect your score in the other parts.
Questions? If you have any questions, please raise your hand and
wait until somebody comes to you.
Formula of your score. Suppose you reported a probability p that
Jennifer will share. If she shares, the score for your prediction is
2 − 2(1 − p)2.
If Jennifer decides not to share, the score for your prediction is
2 − 2p2.
Suppose you believe Jennifer shares with probability q. Your
expected score by reporting p is
2 − 2q(1 − p)2 − 2(1 − q)p2.
You can verify that your expected score is maximized by reporting
your true beliefs, that is, p = q.
All subjects were given the above instructions, with minor adjustments.
The subjects in Utrecht saw four shows in total, of which two were complete
episodes and two were shortened episodes. The shortened episodes did not
include the trivia rounds but did include the beginning where candidates
introduced themselves. In total we used six shows, stratified by gender
composition, percentage sharing, stakes, and percentage of promises and
sharing. The order and length (long/short) were randomized among groups.
The videos were paused at the moment the candidate had to select one of
the other candidates for the final and at the moment that candidates had to
make sharing decisions.
The subjects in Amsterdam saw shortened episodes. Two episodes
included the third round of trivia questions. The other four episodes did
not include trivia rounds. In addition, subjects saw only written transcripts
of the communication of two shows. We showed all remaining episodes.
Episodes were randomized among groups. The videos were paused at the
moment the candidate had to select one of the other candidates for the final,
at the point where a candidate was selected but before communicating and
at the moment that candidates had to make sharing decisions.
In Utrecht all students were paid the week following the experiments. In
Amsterdam students were given the choice of collecting their earnings in
the week following the experiments or one month later at a 10% premium.
We used the choices of the students to classify them as patient or impatient.
Students collecting their earnings early were classified as impatient.
The Amsterdam sessions had two additional tasks. First, we interrupted
the video watching after three episodes to ask subjects to do a short cognitive
ability test, taken from Frederick (2005) but with four additional questions of
a similar nature that were kindly provided to us by Shane Frederick. Second,
after all the episodes were shown, we asked them to fill in a questionnaire
related to risk preferences. We asked them to choose between a fixed amount
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(2 euros) and a lottery (with a 50% chance of earning nothing and a 50%
of earning 3, 3.50, 4, 4.50, 5, 5.50, 6, 6.50 euros, respectively; half of the
sessions had the reverse ordering of lotteries).
We ended with a questionnaire about their personal background. We also
elicited their prior on the probability of sharing and their own choice in a
prisoner’s dilemma (the latter was played for money only in Amsterdam).
The corresponding questions are:
6. Taken over all episodes (69 in total), what do you think is the per-
centage of candidates that shares? (With this question you earn
1 euro in case your answer is within 5 percentage points of the true
percentage.)
8. We now ask you to play the final of the game yourself. You have to
indicate if you want to share or if you do not want to share. Afterward,
we randomly choose two participants of all sessions, and their choices
are matched. These two participants play for 200 euros. The game is
played in the same way as in the TV show. So if you both share, both
get 100 euros. If one shares and the other does not share, the one
who does not share gets all, so 200 euros. If nobody shares, nobody
receives anything.
